ENTERING THE NATIVE'S SOCIAL WORLD: SOME PRACTICAL METHODS
USED IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ADEQUATE ETHNOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT

A central goal of ethnography is to enter into or understand the meaning native members themselves attach to their interactional behavior. Ethnographers, however, are silent in respect to describing how -- in practice -- they appropriate features of the members' perspective. This paper uses an ethnomethodologically informed approach to speculate about the process in ethnography whereby the analyst manages the retrieval of the members' perspective without influencing its makeup by his own analytic frame. The paper concludes with the suggestion that various practical methods are employed that allow the ethnographer to warrantably attach his claim of understanding directly to members' social structures and experiences. These loosely articulated practical methods are viewed as sensitizing frames and glosses for the actual practices ethnographers might demonstrate upon empirical examination of their work.

RESUME

Un but central de l'ethnographie est de pénétrer ou de comprendre la signification qu'attachent les indigènes à leurs comportements inter-personnels. Les ethnographes, cependant, sont muets au sujet de la façon dont -- en pratique -- ils s'approprient la vision des membres de la communauté. Cet essai utilise une approche qui est ethnométhodologiquement formée pour spéculer sur le processus d'ethnographie par lequel l'analyste parvient à retrouver la façon de voir des indigènes sans en modifier le contenu par sa propre structure d'analyse. L'essai se termine en suggérant qu'un certain nombre de méthodes pratiques sont utilisées pour permettre à l'ethnographe de justifier son affirmation qu'il comprend directement les structures et les expériences sociales des indigènes. Ces méthodes pratiques, qui ne sont pas strictement reliées les unes aux autres, constituent des cadres et des commentaires destinés à éveiller l'attention à certaines pratiques qu'on pourrait découvrir quand on examine empiriquement le travail des ethnographes.
INTRODUCTION

Ethnography is a socially organized set of practices. The nature of the organization of these practices and their effects for knowledge production will be considered in this paper as a means for addressing a more central issue: ethnographers' concern for 'adequate ethnography'. The notion 'adequate ethnography' is conceived here as reflectively related to how competent ethnography is done and displayed. By examining the notion 'adequate ethnography' via the practical ethnographic competencies sanctionably displayed and expected, I hope to how how -- at least in some respects -- practice and theorizing mutually elaborate one another in this particular form of social inquiry. My goal is that the discussion will constitute a self-consciousness of how this mutual elaboration is accomplished and, in the process, a self-consciousness of some features of the practice of ethnography.

A strong warrant for doing ethnography, rather than, say, experimentation, centers on the kind of accessibility ethnography gives the analyst to the target group and their form of social life. Becker and Geer call the practice of participant observation in ethnography the "most complete form of the sociological datum" (1969:322). Ethnography somehow explicates the lived world of societal members -- it attempts to 'enter' and understand that world as it is understood by those who produce it -- this is what 'complete' means for Becker and Geer it seems to me. For them, the observer is physically and socially close to the meaningful texture of social life and experience of the analyzed group. A good description of aspects of their social world(s) here must be based on "an observation of some social event, the events which preceded and follow it, and explanations of its meaning by participants and spectators, before, during, and after its occurrence" (1969:322).

The familiar contrast of ethnography with logico-deductive (that is, 'scientific') methods provides an instructive characterization: logico-deductive theorizing and methodological practice distance the analyst from the socially organized world of members because it deciphers their conduct through conceptual parameters that are either alien to the members' sense of their activities or because those parameters are not flexible enough to accommodate the changing processes of their activities and interactions. It erects and employs a grammar that is foreign to their social activities and actions and uses it as a medium for understanding the appearances it is confronted with. In contrast, ethnography, so the characterization goes, seeks to apprehend and understand the socially organized settings of members in the terms members themselves employ to make sense of and to organize their social activities and actions in those settings. Lofland's recommendation for doing ethnography, for example, entails the spatial metaphor 'closeness'. Analysts should be physically close to those they are observing; this, when done over a sufficiently long period of time and number of occasions, both instills and reflects a social closeness with the observed social members -- one of the chief goals of
A generalized rhetoric or ideological stance ethnographers employ in articulating the goals of their analysis, especially as it relates to adequate ethnography and description, is that they are striving to "be true to the phenomenon" (Compare, Matza 1969; Denzin 1971; Becker 1963). Employing a priori concepts with little sensitivity to the social contexts they make visible is viewed as distorting the experience of those the concepts are used to observe. In contrast, 'appreciating' (Matza 1969) members' social meanings and how they understand their social sub-universe is thought to accomplish a superior form of social analysis. Other approaches distort, ethnography "re-constructs" or "re-recovers" or "re-constitutes" the socially organized character of cultural experience, and the claim goes, it does so in terms that remain "faithful to the members' perspective".

THE INTERPENETRATION OF ANALYSIS AND DATA

While the sun may be shining radiantly on ethnography it is prudent not to let smugness hide the inflatedness of these claims concerning what ethnography can -- in practice -- do. In fact, it is quite reasonable that ethnographic description and the actual practices employed in its generation can be focused upon and amplified, thus displaying many ambiguities and glossings with respect to how 'faithfulness' to social phenomena is achieved. Below, I will venture to do just this. Let it be clear, however, that this is done to demystify the relation between practice and knowledge -- it is not done to be merely destructive or to debunk or to show how ethnography does not measure up to its stated program. The focus, ultimately, is on the mysterious process and the practices whereby features of observed social actions are analytically appropriated by the ethnographer and yet enable him to warrantably and legitimately maintain the claim that his methods are not constitutive of the field data, that is, of the 'members' perspective'.

Let me begin by entertaining the above suggested claim that no matter what the ethnographer might say to the contrary, his 'analytic mentality' (Schenkein 1978) and practical ethnographic methods are inevitably constitutive of the data he titles 'the members' perspective'. In doing a descriptive rendering of members' social activities and actions, ethnographers utilize descriptive parameters and methods of interpretation that are grounded in the language usage of an epistemic community (that is, their epistemic community) that is essentially alien to the investigation group. And yet the ethnographers Glazer and Strauss believe that observation involves "allowing substantive concepts and hypotheses to emerge first, on their own" (1967:34; emphasis added). The connotation here is clearly that, in a fundamental way, the analyst is not responsible for producing the intelligibility the 'data' have for him and his colleagues: the data speak for themselves. It seems that ethnography's task is to structure the conditions for the reception of these emergent social phenomena and to apprehend them in fidelity. But what does this mean as a matter of
ethnographic practice? And of ethnographic judgement and competence? What does it look like in practice to have rendered social activities 'faithfully' -- to have 're-covered' them? In other words, how is ethnography done and how is it recognizable as having been achieved? I take it that what makes an ethnographic description 'adequate' is its capacity to unequivocally display members' sense of their activities and actions 'faithfully'. However, beyond the goal of obtaining 'adequate' ethnographic description and the concomitant prescription of faithfulness to the data exist only the vaguest of normative and ideal typical guidelines for accomplishing this feat.

Lofland (1971), for example, suggests the utilization of what he calls 'reasonable substitutes' for actual social occurrences. Lofland (in a similar vein as Schutz [1967]) recommends a form of second order description based on a detailed firsthand acquaintance with social settings, activities and actions. For Glazer and Strauss roughly similar claims are made using the grammar of 'discovering grounded theory'. For these theorists, descriptive concepts (what they call 'categories') 'emerge' to be appropriated and integrated into more abstract depictions of processes of social relations. The 'categories' that 'emerge' and that are thought to reflect the data as self-constituted form the most basic of building blocks for doing ethnographic description and theorizing. Categories and their properties are the point of contact with 'data'. Glazer and Strauss express 'adequate' ethnography as a condition of 'fit': "....[t]he categories...will fit the data, be understood both to sociologists and to laymen who are knowledgeable in the area" (1967:76). Their version of adequacy is further derivable from their suggestions concerning concepts (concepts = categories). Concepts must have two features: 1) they must be analytic, and 2) they must be 'sensitizing'. As Glazer and Strauss put it: "....[t]o make concepts both analytic and sensitizing helps the reader to see and hear vividly the people in the area under study" (1967:39).

What has been alluded to above is a display of the ideology of ethnography that stipulates (but more often only suggests) in the most general (and we might say, ambiguous) of terms, what descriptive adequacy is and, in addition, constitutes the grounds for judging the efficacy of practice in re-constituting social activities and actions as they are understood and received by native actors, that is, constitutes the grounds for judging ethnographic description as adequate. The rhetoric of this ideology, however, can not stand by itself as an assurance that elements of the ethnographers' culture and methods will not intrude and influence the re-constitution of data. The specter of the analyst's analysis and methods constituting the data, it seems, always looms as a possibility for ethnographic description.

So it seems there is always a tension generated by "the possibility that his techniques of gathering data may be constitutive of the data gathered" (Stoddart n.d.[a]:3). Thus the 'good ethnographer seeks not to enforce an organizing schema upon encountered data but to surface from that data a schema local to the domain of investigation" (n.d.[a]:3). To use Glazer and Strauss' recommendation,
the ethnographer allows the data, in their own terms, to emerge and speak. The data, in this view, are self-descriptive and self-explicating. But as Stoddart has rightly pointed out this "appears to assume and neglect more than it reveals...[h]ow, short of using no techniques at all, can the ethnographer actually know a domain's features as they exist independent of his tools of assembly?" (n.d.[a]:3). How, in short, can the domain be known such that the alien culture and methods of the ethnographer are left behind and, therefore, do not become constitutive of the observed data? Surely, however, data only 'emerge' in the sense that they are available as appearances for interpretation -- the schemes and analytic strategies ethnographers employ to re-constitute social action in terms of the received understanding of native members are frameworks located within ethnography, not in the socially organized networks of the natives they are about. The focal point of concern, then, is the interface of that which is analytic with that which is substantive or data.

It seems a reasonable inference from this that the point or place -- analytically speaking -- where ethnography articulates its contact with data will vary among ethnographers. Likewise is it reasonable that the forms descriptions take will vary in accordance with specific recommendations for doing ethnography. For Lofland the initial interpretive framework is a hierarchy of six "qualitative units of analysis": acts, activities, meanings, participation, relationships, and settings (1971:14-53). Ethnographic description proceeds by answering questions pertaining to the characteristics of these various 'units', the forms they assume and the variations they display. A careful examination of Lofland's suggestions for analyzing 'acts', for example, divulges that whereas he defines 'act' behaviorally, his analysis is based on an examination of the symbolic aspects of actions (see 1971:16). Leaving aside this obvious disjunction an examination of the examples Lofland discusses and employs in showing how to find instances of 'acts', it appears one must first locate intentional or motivational content in the social activities exhibited by native members. Then one must locate courses of actions -- unitary 'acts' -- that make sense in light of (or that seem related to) that intentional or motivational content. These 'unit acts' will have a limited, temporally organized duration and a social coherence of their own. Significantly, while this practical ethnographic method certainly 'finds' acts, one is left to wonder where the ethnographic frame ends and "the data" -- 'in their own terms' -- begin.

For Glazer and Straus 'categories' are the point of contact with data. Observable actions are selectively attended and formulated as types (that is, 'categories') by virtue of their perceived meaningful texture and appearance to members. This is the beginning stage of the generation of substantive theory. Whether ethnographic descriptions are based on 'categories' or 'qualitative units', all share the common process of transmutation from actors' production to analysts' reproduction. Theoretical and analytic criteria are used as a basis for this achievement, but in ways such that it becomes very difficult to disentangle exactly how they pre-determine (that is, constitute) the data.
DOING THE WORK FOR THEORIZING

The practical work of doing ethnography that is considered 'adequate' is much less complicated and much less problematic than is suggested by the above discussion of the mysterious process involved in the articulation or interpenetration of analysis on the one hand, with data on the other. In fact, ethnographers manage to secure -- to their satisfaction -- descriptions embodying native members' perspective(s). (It seems to me the promise is no more than this). The key here is the notion 'embody'. What could this term mean?

One question in pursuit of a meaning might be: how is some segment of members' perspective (that is, beingness independent from observation/interpretation by ethnographers) appropriated by the ethnographer? Perhaps if we attempted to answer this question we might shed some light on how ethnographic methods inform the constitution of data, yet do so with an orientation to what the substantive content of action means to native members. But this gives us only a partial sense of what 'embody' could mean. Once the segment of native members' perspective has been appropriated it becomes incorporated into the framework of the analytical purposes of the ethnographer. From this point on the members' point of view loses a measure of the autonomy and previous situated integrity it had -- it begins to come more under the sway of the theorist. Thus, some form of the members' perspective is embodied within the ethnographers' analytical treatment of substantive details.

In the latter part of this paper I would like to address the issue of how ethnographers might actually do the appropriation of the members' point of view. I would like to suggest that certain procedures are used in doing the appropriation of members' motives, intentions, reasons, attitudes, meanings, etc. I would like, in what follows, to outline in a very general way how ethnography gets done as practical (ethnographic) work in pursuit of an appropriation of aspects of the members' perspective. The types of procedures I discuss below are not conceived as being exhaustive of ethnographers' methods, nor do I wish to suggest that they are precisely detailed accounts based on an ethnography of ethnography. Rather, these types should be viewed as tentative structural outlines of the methods ethnographers use to 'reconstruct' the members' perspective. As such they represent glosses of the situated practices of ethnographic appropriation.

THE METHOD OF MEMBERS' ASSENT

A time-honored and warranted method of appropriating a snatch of members' perspective is to explicitly formulate some features(s) of members' interactions which members themselves make accountable or observable to the ethnographer. This may entail querying members about a) the meaning of events and actions they perform, b) the social implications of actions and meanings, c) the purposefulness inhering in specific actions, and so on. The crucial requirement here -- to bring about adequate ethnography and description -- is to somehow obtain or elicit from members what amounts to their agreement or assent that, for example, feature X of the culture or society is understood by the
ethnographer in question. This 'method of members' assent' does yeoman service by allowing the ethnographer to attach his claim of understanding directly to members' social experience. Then, of course, comes a theoretical reframing of what has been appropriated. It becomes an 'idexical particular' (Garfinkel 1967; Tuchman 1978) in another context.

The ethnographer's knowledge of common-sense reasoning and language use allows him to predict actions, construct scenarios, make sense of verbal and non-verbal displays, etc. In the Chomskyan (1965) sense, the ethnographer will have competence in many areas of social life of the members' community -- that is to say, he will know much about patterns of conduct and their meanings to the relevant members. Performance of that knowledge does not seem nearly as important (compare Stoddart n.d.[b]); however, I suspect in some respects, and for reasons of practical accessibility, some 'minimal participation' level performances are required. Crucially -- for the accomplishment of adequate ethnography -- the ethnographer speaks his knowledge in the form of a presentation that is evaluated by natives as to its accuracy, validity, insightfulness, etc. (compare Blumer 1969; Whyte 1955). The ethnographer's analytic appropriation of segments of members' perspective takes the form of a ritualized ceremony of reciprocity: the ethnographer can obtain ownership of that segment of members' social life upon members' assent in respect to his knowledge of them.

INFERRING THE MEMBERS' PERSPECTIVE

BASED ON ENTERTAINING A SUSTAINED DIALOGUE

Another method of appropriation is less direct but still requires that the ethnographer has direct social contact with native members. It is to features of their social encounters with native members that ethnographers attend for some evidence of the symbolic sense natives make of their activities. Here some of the forms of understanding the ethnographer makes of his encounters with natives may be couched in the grammar of his professional epistemic community (if in fact it does not display some select membership (e.g. 'structuralist') of that epistemic community). As such, direct questions (to natives) pertaining to issues and topics that are grounded in this language-game are not as easily explored. On the other hand, virtually all of the ethnographer's personal knowledge of 'his people' will likely be grounded in the practical social management of his conduct and identity in relation to them -- his 'professional stranger' self. Thus, it would seem that a fairly large gulf exists between what we might call his 'esoteric self' and his practical social self -- his 'professional stranger' self.

At a point when his linguistic performance is at an appropriate level, he may be able to make inquiries about natives' conduct, paying heed to his present knowledge or what he sees as the locally applicable rules. He will be able to engage in forms of 'limited' interaction with natives, ideally gaining progressively more extensive intimacy and access as knowledge and social management skills accumulate and push the process forward. It is the 'sustained dialogue' he is able to
achieve -- apart from its actually mediating information about natives (for example, direct confirmation of beliefs they have) -- that appears as a phenomenon that can be analyzed. 'Sustaining a dialogue' is evidence that a degree of overlapping or mutual knowledge underpins the interaction. It is then a question of particularizing features of this interchange -- finding what might act as a basis for sustaining the dialogue. The ethnographers' display of native competence in the form of sustaining a dialogue with members might allow inferences about attitude, belief, etc., to be indirectly assessed. This process can not be seen as mutually exclusive of other methods of appropriation of gain course.

SILENT METHODS

While the method of members' assent represents a direct attempt to access to the members' perspective, and entertaining a sustained dialogue constitutes a less overt and direct method of appropriation, what I will call 'silent methods' make up the most elaborate, least accessible, and most frequently occurring methods of ethnographic appropriation of the natives' perspective.

One such method in very widespread use among ethnographers is probably the 'documentary method of interpretation' (compare Garfinkel 1967). Ethnographers begin to see pattern(s), regularity or rules of conduct -- in other words, they begin to become sensitized to what to look for -- and selected observation will qualify and modify their emerging version of selected aspects of the life-world of natives. In orienting to as many of their observations as possible by using the device "how would a member make sense of that?", ethnographers enable themselves to assimilate actions to definite analytic categories.

THE METHODS OF MEMBERSHIP AND CONTEXT CONSTRUCTION

These two forms of displaying an orientation to the members' perspective are typical of an ethnomethodological analysis of social action. Here the analyst is not concerned to speak his knowledge and have it directly confirmed as correct by members. Rather, confirmation that the ethnomethodologist as ethnographer has produced an adequate description turns on its perceived capacity to re-produce membership (compare, Garfinkel 1967). Theoretically, this would refer to re-producing membership for himself or another person or for some hypothetical, programmable other. Alternatively, a description of the occasioned practices that perceivedly re-assemble an ethnographic context will likewise constitute adequate description (compare Zimmerman and Pollner 1970).

For ethnomethodology it seems that adequate description is accomplished by "the ability to reproduce by rule (selected aspects of) the sequence of steps by which a given social activity recognizable appears over time" (Churchill 1971:183-4). The analysis of the confluence of rules and practices that assemble membership and social occasions assumes that as its outcome will in fact be produced a specifically ordered social environment that is recognizable to members. This kind of analysis moves a step beyond the conventional
ethnographic goal of the appropriation of members, meaning structures to attempts to describe how these structures are brought about by members in situated conduct. The concern is to explicate both competence and performance as compared with the explication of competence alone in conventional ethnography.

Ethnomethodology too relies on the analyst to specify the descriptive criteria that will constitute a re-construction of the social occasion or membership performance -- this is roughly analogous to the previously discussed circumstance where the ethnographer delineates the conditions of successful description, then judges their actual achievement. This also involves the very large assumption that the analyst's practical theoretical claims would in fact be verified (that is, by re-production of the social situation or membership abilities) were it possible to structure the conditions to actually re-produce members' social occasions and skills.

CONCLUSION

The central issue this paper has addressed is how ethnographers resolve the theoretically problematic constitution of the data by their methods. One of the chief rallying calls of ethnography has been the ideology of re-covering the members' perspective. While it is clear that ethnography can never completely escape what Stoddart calls "methodogenesis" (n.d.[a]:11) this poses problems precisely because the ideology appears in jeopardy. These difficulties become resolved by various practical ethnographic methods which provide for access to the data and this is expressed in terms of members' sense-making orientation(s). While ethnographers set the analytic parameters for the reception of the members' perspective (for example, Glazer and Strauss' 'categories'; Lofland's 'qualitative units', etc.), warranted practices and demonstrations that the 'faithfulness' claim has been met seem essential. This means motivated attempts not just to appear to have been 'faithful', but motivated concerns to carry out -- in practice -- an adequate rendering of the members' sense of their social activities and actions. This paper has addressed the issue of the practices associated with the ethnographic ideology of "faithfulness", attempting to outline some 'method of ethnographic appropriation'.

In adopting this kind of analysis to address ethnography I have accepted as a central position what is best stated by Wieder:

The problems encountered in describing and explaining social action hinge in part on the notion that on the one hand there is an event in the world, a social action, and on the other, another event which is the description of that action and of the method of producing that description (1974:224).

The concern here has been to address the methods of producing the ethnographic description; methods that demonstrate the transposition of members' lived social experience into the possession of alien knowledge
specialists; that is, ethnographers. Good or 'adequate' ethnography requires as a feature of its social practice a demonstration of close alignment with native members' social sensibilities. The methods I have outlined above I think display attempts to achieve this unity (for example, the 'method of members' assent' shows an alignment by gaining members' evaluative confirmation of the ethnographers' interpretation).

In the final analysis "what ultimately gives a form of expression its sense is the social practice in which it has a place" (Hertzberg 1980:155). Thus, instead of mere rhetoric there exist methods and practices to provide a basis for honoring its claim to producing adequate forms of ethnographic description.
NOTES

1. The key point to note here is that this assumes an understanding of what 'adequate ethnography' might look like to begin with. "Faithfulness to the phenomenon" or "being true to the phenomenon" does not specify, in the substantive case, what would realize 'faithfulness' or 'being true'. In order to proceed at all we must have a sense to begin with what would count as instances of 'faithfulness', etc.

2. For a discussion of the 'professionalization of epistemic communities' see Holzner and Marx (1979:196-205).

3. This is a tautology of course: 'adequacy' is provided for by 'faithfulness' and 'faithfulness' suggests that 'adequacy' has been achieved.

4. This is Blumer's (1964) notion and means that concepts are not fixed but must be sensitive to the changes in meanings within and across social settings.

5. As the reader will recall, this is a variation of the problem exemplified earlier by logico-deductivists. The critique of logico-deduction, from the point of view of ethnography, at least as I understand it, is that logico-deduction 'imposes' a conceptual frame on social action produced by native members. The 'results', then, can be seen as much to be artifacts of this imposition of a conceptual and theoretical logic as they are reflections of the social experience of those they purport to reflect. Ethnography is said to proceed inductively, generating descriptions a posteriori so that they will accord with native members' experience. Descriptions are modified so they reflect the world they are about. But this does not eliminate the possibility that the analyst's methods will (in some manner) become constitutive of the data. In the case of ethnography, the analyst's methods now become constitutive of the data as it is oriented to by native members.

6. The following will give some sense of how Glazer and Strauss conceive of this process of appropriation: "As categories and their properties emerge, the analyst will discover two kinds: those that he has constructed himself (such as 'social loss' or 'calculation' of social loss); and those that have been abstracted from the language of the research situation. (For example, 'composure' was derived from nurses' statements like 'I was afraid of losing my composure when the family started crying over their child.'). As his theory develops, the analyst will notice that the concepts abstracted from the substantive situation will tend to the current labels in use for the actual processes and behaviors that are to be explained, while the concepts constructed by the analyst will tend to be the explanations" (1967:107).
7. Geertz says the following on this point: "analysis penetrates into the very body of the object -- that is, we begin with our own interpretations of what our informants are up to, or think they are up to, and then systematize those -- the line between (Moroccan) culture as a natural fact and (Moroccan) culture as a theoretical entity tends to get blurred" (1973:15).


9. This is my own interpretation. Lofland provides a series of examples to illustrate different sorts of 'acts' in various ethnographically examined social settings. The overarching similarity of all these examples is that they discuss an intention (for example, Davis (1959:163) notes taxi drivers intentions to obtain what they consider a 'proper tip'). He (Lofland) then lists short duration behavioral sequences that are tied to or correlated with the intention (for example, Davis (1959:163) lists five such sort duration activities, one of which is "giving the passenger a hard-luck story"). These short duration sequences are meaningful and recognizable as unitary only in light of their association with specifically recognized intentions.

10. This process of the linguistic presentation of material and subsequent obtaining of members' assent needs detailed examination -- and 'ethnography of ethnography'. A question suggested by this is: what are the practices that constitute this examination of ethnography? The very 'problem' we are attempting to address is inherent in the methods we are using to address it. Do we use the 'method of assent' to determine how ethnography connects with data? This so-called 'problem of infinite regress' has been dealt with by Wilson (1972) and will constitute the position taken here. Wilson says, "the only way an ethnomethodologist can complete the analysis of the original situation under study is to refuse to treat his own interpretive practices as phenomena, at least while he is in the midst of his original investigation. Otherwise, he is caught in an infinite regress that quite literally takes him out of this world. The situation is analogous to that of a neurophysiologist investigating the functions of the normal human brain: while he is dissecting or otherwise experimenting with human brains, he must leave his own brain intact and take its normal functioning for granted" (1972:6-7). In the strict sense we are not faced with this problem since we are not doing a detailed empirical examination of the practices of ethnography.

11. In the terminology of Mead (1934) the ethnographer has been able to "take the role of the other" in providing for the specific content of his contribution to their joint encounter.

12. The sense-making exemplified in footnote 6 for Glazer and Strauss is a good demonstration of this process at work.
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