ANDREW LANG: MASTER OF FAIRYLAND

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ABSTRACT

Andrew Lang, 19th century British anthropologist and editor of folk tales for children, represents a unique synthesis of culture and personality. A proponent of cultural evolutionism, Lang believed that prehistoric and contemporary "uncultivated" peoples inhabit an enchanted mental universe. This same pre-logical thinking, however, is expressed in Lang's own methodology, and later, when evolutionary theory had become disreputable, in Lang's Colour Fairy Books. This irony's likelihood is enhanced by his extreme bibliophilia and the delicate moral temper of his times. Both suggest a peculiar sensibility. A spectacular writing style and his popularizing efforts mark Lang's contribution to the field.

RÉSUMÉ

Andrew Lang, anthropologue britannique et éditeur de contes d'enfants du 19e siècle, représente une synthèse unique de culture et de 'personnalité'. En tant que promoteur de théorie de l'évolution culturelle, Lang croyait que les peuples préhistoriques et les sauvages contemporains étaient moyens d'une mentalité phantasmagorique, pré-logique. Pourtant ce même mode de pensée caractérise la méthodologie de Lang ainsi que, plus tard ses Colour Fairy Books, lorsque la théorie de l'évolution fut réfutée dans les milieux académiques. Cette ironie est rehaussée par sa passion littéraire extrême et par le caractère moral délicat de ses temps. Ces deux phénomènes suggèrent une sensibilité pécuilière. Sa contribution principale à la discipline est marquée par un style de rédaction spectaculaire et par ses efforts àpopulariser ses travaux.

INTRODUCTION

Although the story of Andrew Lang's life has been written twice, none of his biographers have chosen for him the genre that suits this obscure figure best: the fairy tale. An account of this 19th century British anthropologist's work, its character, and his contribution to the discipline must also recognize Lang's many strange and fantastic
guises: Lang the folklorist, the classicist, the romantic poet, the literary scholar, the journalist, the historian, the parapsychologist, the author of 120 books and a contributor to 150 more. However, the most significant of all these roles is that one which a Lang biographer, Roger L. Green, chose in honour of Lang's editions of folk tales for children: the Master of Fairyland.

Lang's efforts as an editor, and as an anthropologist specializing in folklore, are of particular interest. Beyond the fascination his superhuman output and varied career holds for the modern reader is another level of attraction -- a synthesis of late 19th century culture, anthropology and Lang's own personality.

This synthesis is apparent in his writing. Quite uncannily, Lang displays in his anthropological and literary production the same pre-logical, almost magical thinking he attributed to prehistoric and contemporary "primitive" peoples. When such thinking, the believed outcome of his bookish personal and the naive moral nature of his age, became untenable in his social scientific writing, this mystical mental universe reappeared in his folklore adaptations for young people, called The Colour Fairy Books. In this paper, I shall attempt to explain this synthesis more fully by outlining Lang's life, personality, work and times, and then speculating on how these features came together so unusually.

BIOGRAPHY AND PERSONALITY

Andrew Lang was born March 31, 1844, to a middle class family in the border country of Selkirk County, Scotland. The eldest of seven children, his childhood was characterized by his precocious love of books. It was this bibliophilia, biographer Eleanor De Selms Langstaff believes, which contributed to Lang's eccentric self. Little is known of Lang's childhood as he was, for all this prolificacy in later life, an intensely private man, and one more comfortable in the company of children than of his contemporaries. His early exposure to the folktales told by his family's servants may have initiated his interest in folklore, and in the value of a tale well told. Antony De Cocq (1968:42) speculates that

Lang's interest in folklore was probably the result of his childhood environment and his inclination toward romanticism... his interest in mythology was very probably the result of his study in the classics, and... his interests in folklore and mythology brought him into contact with anthropology.

Notwithstanding his long interest in anthropology, Lang did no fieldwork, nor did he complete a formal education in the discipline at any time in his life -- a profile typical of late Victorian era anthropologists. After his death in 1912 following years of ill health and several brushes with tuberculosis, his widow destroyed all of his correspondence in order to thwart would-be biographers. Langstaff (1978:17) comments on a rare autobiographical essay published in 1905, and aptly titled "Adventures Among Books":

In it, Lang emphasized his bookishness and willingness to live a life wholly given up to the world of his imagination while totally suppressing the other facet of his character: his life as a social scientist and promoter of the social sciences.
The suppression of Lang the social scientist occurs only in "Adventures Among Books"; elsewhere in his voluminous anthropological writing, culture theory, ethnological fact and Lang's own fictions mingle freely. Indeed, the style of his observations shares much with the "science" practiced by Lang's eminent peer, Sir James George Frazer, in which ancient texts are plumbed for their anthropological truth, and then thickened with enough speculation to create what appear to be credible and consistent cultural patterns. The Vedas, the Bible, and the works of Homer offer their contents to the studied playfulness of Lang's anthropological texts: Custom and Myth (1885); Myth, Ritual and Religion (1887, and issued in a revised form as was Lang's habit, in 1899 and 1906), which is held to be Lang's definitive anthropological work; Modern Mythology: A Reply to Max Mueller (1897), which addressed Mueller's polemics on the problems of Lang's mode of folklore interpretation; The Making of Religion (1901), a reply to Frazer's The Golden Bough; The Secret of the Totem (1905), a late text in which Lang expounded his social theories; and The World of Homer. (1910). In this last text, it was Lang's avowed object "to prove... that Homeric civilization, in all its details, was lived at a brief given period; that it was real."

Lang's ethnological gloss of the world of The Iliad and The Odyssey points to the paradox that was to dominate his life: Homer's Greece was real; the enchanted realm of folk tales was real; in fact, fiction provided a reality more convincing and influential than the one he lived. Langstaff (1978:18) explains how Lang was affected by his reading:

His liking for fairy tales and adventure stories had a quality that he retained in adulthood. The wicked witch must always die; the hero, after shedding buckets of blood, must save the day and get the girl. A logic that required that the blood be real, that injustice happen to the outright and pure of heart and never be rectified, Lang rejected as man and boy.

Remembered as "perhaps the most literary temperament that ever lived," Lang exhibits his preference for the company of literary and historical figures in the following passage:

We are more at home under some departed Henry, James or George than under her present Majesty who is so much better than any George, James, Charles or Henry. We are more intimate with Falstaff, Hamlet, Athos... than with Mr. Chamberlain or Me. Labori.... (Green 1946:214)

After an early education at a local grammar school and Edinburgh Academy, Lang matriculated at Scotland's St. Andrews University. Here, while studying Greek, Latin, Mathematics, Logic and Metaphysics, Lang read the works of Browning, Edmund Spenser, the Brothers Grimm and Welsh folktales. He also began to publish romantic poetry, an interest he would share with many poets of the period, including Austin Dobson and Edmund Gosse. Langstaff (1978:18) speaks of

the poet who could never bring himself to develop in his works that third dimension of humanity, man's penchant for mixed motives: to turn away from this aspect of the human condition is to fail to produce an enduring comment on it.

Lang's anthropological writing suffers from the same incapacity. Like James Frazer's
analysis, Lang's armchair ethnology of peoples reflects the beautiful, improbable conjectures of a literary man, not the conclusions of a veteran anthropologist returned from the field.

Lang transferred from the spare St. Andrews campus, situated on the rocky shore of the North Sea, to the "smog and smoke" of industrial Glasgow, and Glasgow University. Here he competed successfully for the Snell Exhibition, a scholarship given to Scottish undergraduates studying at Oxford University, and subsequently entered Oxford's Balliol College to study Classics in 1864. Following a string of academic achievements in his early years at school, Lang attained a first at Oxford, and won an Open Fellowship at Merton College, where he served as a fellow during the years 1868-1875.

This was a busy if unassuming period of Lang's life, full of lecturing, review and article writing. This period also saw several milestones. Lang published a book of poems, Ballads and Lyrics of Old France, and Other Poems and his first academic article on folklore, entitled "The Kalevela," which discussed the mythological elements in this Finnish epic poem. At this time, he also married Lenora Blanche Alleyne. The daughter of a wealthy Scottish family, she later collaborated as a co-editor with Lang of The Colour Fairy Books. Published between 1889 and 1910, these twelve anthologies of folk tales collected from around the world dominate Lang's production in his later career. Adapted for a British audience by the Langs and several guest editors, the fairy books were enormously popular in their day, and can be found gracing the shelves of better bookstores today. Filled with Lang's rich, genteel prose, they reflect -- in such stories as "An Impossible Enchantment," "The Story of the Queen of the Flowery Isles," and "The Little Grey Man" -- Lang's literary and folkloric interests, as well as his concern to reach the widest and most heterogeneous audience possible.

To understand the relationship between Lang's personality and his culture, Lang must be examined as a child of his times. After relinquishing his fellowship at Merton in 1875, Lang left for London's Grub Street and a career as a popular journalist. Here his genius for dilettantism made itself known. Called the "Divine Amateur," Lang published articles on every imaginable topic in the popular magazines of the period, from "Savage Spiritualism" to "Golf Old and New." His intellectual philandering was, however, appropriate to the late 19th century, characterized by Lang and others as "neo-Alexandrian" (after Ptolemaic Alexandria). Langstaff (1978:38) writes:

Lang described his vision of the first Alexandrian Age in his introduction to Theocritus, Bion and Moschus [his translation of poetry written by the named third century B.C. poets]: pastoral poets who were welcomed into decadent society as a sort of air freshener, to sing of a way of life lost to the urbanites; simple housing, clothing, and food.... Like Theocritus, [Lang] needed preferment, which in the nineteenth century meant a way to earn a living; he would not carve out his art alone. Perhaps he was psychologically unable to make the necessary choices, to leave family and friends behind, to strike out companionless into a solitude as much spiritual as social, to confront truth and make it art. The solution for Lang was to take up the minor aspects of his art, to cultivate "littleness."

This "cult of littleness" may be seen as the enaction of a simple, if highly cultivated sensibility of Lang. It was a sensibility marked by a binary morality and a "literariness" extreme to the point of making his life literally permeable to his art. Whether Lang was writing of the Jacobites in his History of Scotland from the Roman Occupation (in four volumes, 1900-1907), or of the confusion he found in the texts of the
ancient Aryan peoples, he was everywhere redeeming the obscure from history, the "cultural survival" from folklore; the rational and orderly, that is, from the irrational and chaotic of times past. It may be understood then why the folk tales might, of all his issue, alone be that which consummates the fictionalizing he pursued throughout his life. In them, while failing to make truth art, Lang made art a kind of truth. Langstaff (1978:39) summarizes the relationship between the moment and the man:

Nostalgia is essentially a fictionalization of life. An age or a writer that continually seeks refuge in nostalgia is unlikely to make a great statement about man's condition. A Silver Age, an Alexandrian Age, may not make a great statement about man, but one clear soft voice may leave the future with a phrase that states a small fact truly; Lang had this voice.

Lang did value science, and particularly social science, as the pre-eminent source of human knowledge. He felt that the new "modern" literature of his age had substituted science for art in its fin de siècle experimentation, thereby defrocking literary authors as high priests of culture. No longer was literature to serve as the basis of a liberal education; rather, the social sciences were to be principally responsible for the maintenance of civilization.

Folk tales, or fairy tales (as the British termed them), in Lang's conception bridge anthropology and literature. He believed that folk tales, along with myth and legend, had been created originally by prehistoric peoples during an early, pre-logical phase of human intellectual development. As the most literary of the three forms, folk tales were to substitute for decadent literature as the basis of the proposed curriculum. The evolution of culture had, to Lang, finally brought anthropology into its own as the foremost source of learning.

Langstaff (1978:122) elaborates Lang's theory of fairy literature:

Fairy tales ate the literary parts of texts transmitted from generation to generation by primitive societies, together with myths (explorations of natural phenomena) and legends (historical accounts with fictional elements attaching to a famous person). But fairy tales are both conscious art and unconscious cultural transmission, based -- and this was the nucleus of Lang's theory-- on concepts rather than verbal symbols.

Langstaff (1978:122) explains that Lang "grew to this awareness" early in his career, and the fairy books "were a fairly late manifestation of this interest." Nonetheless, both the momentum of his anthropological development and the books owe their origins to Lang's ideas about the prehistoric confection of folklore, myths and legends.

LANG AND THE EVOLUTION OF FOLK TALES

Lang subscribed to the evolutionary construct common among the anthropologists with whom he was often in friendly and polemic correspondence: these included E.B. Tylor (who met Lang at Oxford, and to whom Lang dedicated Custom and Myth), Frazer and Herbert Spencer. The cultural evolution school assumed a three-stage theory of cultural progress as its basis -- most often the stages of savagery, barbarism and civilization made famous by Lewis Henry Morgan -- and argued the truth of four other
tenets: psychic unity, comparative method, cultural survivals, and a rationalist approach to cultural origins (De Cocq: 1968, 98).\footnote{1}

Lang had his own version of evolutionary doctrine. To him, psychic unity was expressed in a natural stage within the evolution of the human mind. This stage, according to Lang, was still present in the religious beliefs and practices of contemporary "savages," and to a lesser degree, among the peasant and working class folk of Europe, religion being the most conservative of culture's qualities. This stage coincided with the origin of the three primitive forms of literature -- myth, legend, and folk tale -- and explained many of the irrational cultural items that had survived in ancient classical literature, non-western writing, and the folklore of the majority in the 19th century. Langstaff (1978:134) outlines the theory Lang espoused early in his career:

At this time [approximately 1870], Lang thought that the evolutionary theory could be applied strictly to the development of folktales, a line which he later had to abandon regretfully since his evidence was too mixed. But at the time he wrote the introduction to The Household Tales, he was developing the theory that myths consistently preceded the tales -- that many were independently invented by early man to explain phenomena they [sic] had observed.

The fairy-cum-folk tales read by British school children, Lang believed, began as prehistoric science -- and even, if one were to extend the definition of "phenomena" to include early societies -- prehistoric anthropology. As the observations were passed down, each teller would add contemporary detail to the story -- names, places, local customs and geography -- in order to balance the irrational elements, so that the story could be intelligible to the listener or reader. So evolving by verisimilitude, the folk tale became a motherlode of ethnographic information that the anthropologist might use to explain the lives of peoples long extinct. This was the very use Lang put the tales to in his thick chapters on "Indo-Aryan Myths," "Hottentot Mythology," and "Apollo and the Mouse."

A passage from his first major folklore study, Custom and Myth, attests to Lang's belief in a literal, enchanted, Levy-Bruhlian period in prehistory. Myth was the original medium for the species' creative confusion, and the font of folklore too. Langstaff (1978:24) writes:

In the case of the myths, the need was to explain certain phenomena -- the material (so to speak) was an early state of the human mind, to which all objects seemed equally endowed with human personality, and to which no metamorphosis appeared impossible.

In the 1906 edition of Myth, Ritual and Religion, Lang (1905:344) put forward a subtly different proposition regarding the character of the "savage mind":

When we speak of "the savage mental condition," we mean the mental condition of all uncultivated races who still fail to draw any marked line between man and the animate or inanimate things in the world, and who explain physical phenomena on a vague theory, more or less consciously held, that all nature is animated and endowed with human attributes.
This second, less orthodox interpretation of the "savage mind" may indicate the degree to which evolutionary theories of cultural development had declined by 1905. Lang (1905:350) wrote in the same text: "About what was 'primitive,' as we have no historical information on the topic, we express no opinion at all." Even as his definition was liberalized, and later rendered obsolete, Lang became in his more mature years disenchanted with the whole social scientific enterprise. No longer were the social sciences to be the basis of a liberal education, or the foremost interpreter of the human condition. Near the end of his life, he came to feel that "the social sciences offered no elevation of the human spirit" (Langstaff 1978:92).

This paper seeks to explain why Lang suffered this loss of faith. It holds that the premises on which Lang's comparative method was laid were destined to betray his innocence. Betray it, that is, because these premises were identical to those that informed the prehistoric state of mind he had earlier formulated, premises that were shamed by the discipline's growing interest in diffusion theory, and its increasing methodological rigour (culminating in the 1920s and the Boasian school). While social science could no longer offer paeans to the human spirit, fairy tales that incorporated these same precepts of magical thinking could continue to celebrate humanity in the unqualifying Langian style.

Lang (1884:21) defined his version of comparative method -- what he called the "anthropological method" -- in this way:

Our method... is to compare the seemingly meaningless customs or manners of civilized races with the same customs or manners which exist among the uncivilized and still retain their meaning. It is not necessary for comparison of this sort that the uncivilized and civilized race should be of the same stock, nor need we prove that they were ever in contact with each other. Similar conditions produce similar practices, apart from the identity of race, or borrowing of ideas and manners.

The material cultures of two different societies, in practice, can resemble each other by virtue of similar conditions. Lang describes the coincidence of similarly shaped arrowheads and pottery in Custom and Myth, and explains that each kindred pair of artifacts resulted from common need dictating the use of the same crude materials and tools.

However, intellectual culture cannot be explained in this way, particularly when a theory of the evolution of ideas is emphasized and any hope of diffusion banished. Although but an inkling of Lang's distaste for diffusion is to be seen in the line "nor need we prove that they were ever in contact with each other," De Cocq notes an inordinate stress on the independent evolution of cultural forms in Lang's writing. De Cocq (1968:71) comments:

Although [Lang] does here mention some... factors which would aid the diffusion of myths and tales, his preference for the theory of independent invention is evident... [Lang] justly adds: "As to borrowing, the process lies behind history: we can only guess at it, we can seldom trace a popular legend on its travels."

De Cocq (1968:72) also mentions Joseph Jacobs, a contemporary of Lang's, who
accused Lang of tacit membership in the Casualist school. This was a school which, in attributing the resemblance of folk tales in distant cultures to independent evolution, "seemed to overlook the improbability... of a complicated series of incidents occurring independently and casually in several localities." In his own defense, Lang wrote in his 1893 article "Cinderella and Diffusion of Tales" that "in 1872... I may have, somehow, been inclined to a mystic theory of Marchen-forms, everywhere present in the human intellect" (De Cocq 1968:73). Lang would write later that his own position since 1872 had been tending toward the "Borrowing Theory" (De Cocq 1968:73); yet, in the same article, published only fifteen years before his death, he argued that however folk stories' plots may have diffused, most of the tales' details are owed to independent invention (De Cocq 1968:72).

To downplay diffusion just as it was coming into vogue, and to be known to have held to an early "strict" interpretation of evolutionary theory, are facets of Lang's thought which relate provocatively to his theory of humankind's pre-logical mentality. Continuing to hold in late career to the idea that two cultures at a temporal and spatial distance could share traits, Lang changed his opinion as to how this could occur. This sharing was proved, Lang believed, no longer by an original confused mental condition which was responsible for the irrational in culture, but by the action of "undesigned coincidence." By undesigned coincidence, an idea Lang borrowed from Tylor, Lang meant that axiom of comparative or anthropological method by which ethnographic data is validated. Lang (1906: Vol. 1, 355) quotes Tylor in *Myth, Ritual and Religion*:

> Now the most important facts of ethnography are vouched for in this way. Experience leads the student after a while to expect and find that phenomena of culture, as resulting from widely-acting similar causes, should recur again and again in the world. He even mistrusts isolated statements to which he knows of no parallel elsewhere, and waits for their genuineness to be shown by corresponding accounts for the other side of the earth at the other end of history.

That is, the proof of an evolutionary relationship between two cultures is the proof of analogy, that "like" cultural artifact relates to "like" artifact across time and space. In Tylor's case, diffusion was admitted, so that undesigned coincidence alone need not be the sole evidence that two cultures were related. In Lang's case, however, analogy was practically all he had, because he had dismissed diffusion; objects were related in an evolutionary scheme by virtue of the fact that two isolated descriptions of the respective artifacts were similar. A function of this concept, and of evolutionary theory generally, was another precept of "magical" thinking: the idea that when one ethnographical fact preceded another in time, a causal relationship was revealed.

These are the same specious precepts Lang offers as the definition of the "savage mind" in *Myth, Ritual and Religion*. Lang (1906: Vol. 1, 96) writes:

> The chief principle... of savage science is that antecedence and consequence in time are the same as cause and effect. Again, savage science holds that like affects like: that you can injure a man, for example, by injuring his effigy. On these principles the savage explains the world to himself, and on these principles he tries to subdue the world.... the putting of these principles into practice is simply the exercise of art magic, an art to which nothing seems impossible.
Such an art magic, it now may be seen, is the stuff of Lang's anthropology and *The Colour Fairy Books*. These two precepts -- association by analogy and by antecedence in time -- are those which support Lang's comparative method. They also constitute the foundation on which Lang's anthropology is understood, and its value recognized.

It is even more interesting, given the evidence of Lang's indomitable "literariness" and the romantic quality of his times, to believe that once he dropped his theory of the mystifying thought processes of early humans, it became useful in its obvious analogue--the anything-can-happen world of the fairy books. In these books, Lang could transplant the magical principles he had identified and (it is speculated) practiced in his early anthropology.²

Just as magically do the characters that appear in *The Colour Fairy Books* operate. Here, in a world where analogy and antecedence do affect reality, is Andrew Lang among like-minded friends. In the stories, Lang's unique sensibility is fully expressed, just as it is fully appreciated by anyone who has read them and believed, for a moment, that horses could talk or brushes really transform into thick woods. A passage from "The Magician's Horse" illustrates the power of "analogical logic":

"We must make haste," said the horse. And shortly after he said:
"Look back again; he can't be far off now."

The prince turned in his saddle, and exclaimed: "He is close behind us.
In a minute the flame from his horse's nostrils will reach us."

"Then throw the brush on the ground," said the horse.

And the prince threw it, and in an instant the brush was changed into such a thick wood that even a bird could not have got through it, and when the old man got up to it the roan horse came suddenly to a stand-still, not able to advance a step into the thick tangle. So there was nothing for the magician to do but to retrace his steps, to fetch an axe, with which he cut himself a way through the wood. But it took him some time, during which the prince and the black horse got well ahead (Lang 1895:97).

Lang's Contribution

What further can be written of Andrew Lang's anthropology? There was his belief, contrary to E. B. Tylor's theory of animism, that early humans were monotheists; there was his charge that Frazer had not evaluated his sources properly, moving the latter to a third and final revision of *The Golden Bough*; there was his polemic war with Max Mueller over the ultimate origin of myth, which Lang won, dislodging Mueller's "disease theory" of myth as accepted doctrine in folklore studies; there was Lang's fascinating idea, herein unexplored, that parapsychology and anthropology are academic kith and kin; and there is the perception, shared by his biographers, that throughout the writing there is a dry, mischievous sense of humour present, one that subverts the high seriousness of the works.

Lang's most important contribution to anthropology is not his theory, but his practice. He brought public attention to the discipline through his articles in the popular press, an activity which cultivated a lay audience for anthropology when its legitimacy was still undecided.

It is perhaps not a great contribution for a man whose ambition it was to subdue the world with social science. But his love for anthropology -- which may have
compelled his interest in democratizing it -- cannot be mistaken; and, taking the long view, it may even be judged as a more important contribution to the discipline. Without Lang's popularizing efforts, it is possible that anthropology's claim to credibility might have less chance of success in this century.

Nonetheless, Lang's work seems to have been largely banished to the discipline's hinterland, settled already by polygenists, noble savages and Social Darwinists. Among his biographers and critics, De Cocq allows Lang a modest part in the intellectual history of mythology and comparative religion studies (De Cocq 1968:132). Roger Green, (1946:73) in what is otherwise a rather kind biography, damns Lang's contribution by qualification: "His books are, for the student of the subject, practically obsolete now--though the earlier ones make delightful reading for the amateur." Langstaff (1978:51), though, attributes to Lang a little more:

It is fitting that, since in Lang's concept of his world science took pride of place, his contribution to learning should be in a social science. He tumbled the god of philological anthropology [Max Mueller] and taught the public that there were more similarities than differences between it and primitive societies. From the comparative method so original in Lang's time--commonplace today -- has stemmed the whole of modern anthropology.

As anthropologists --those people of the one wild idea -- we owe little of our discipline's theoretical substance to Lang. We are, however, indebted to his style. In reading Lang, the student anthropologist is persuaded that some of the Fairyland Master's idiosyncrasy, his responsibility to the lay audience, and his rainbow-chasing writing style should remain with us. He is compelling for us because he persists in being so extraordinarily marginal, so stubborn in throwing his lot in with the untried idea and the "uncultivated" culture. Surely, the truth in his weirdness and the delightful way in which he expressed it can be considered an addition to anthropology's own weirdness, to its continued wildness in this civilized age.

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"For these sound reasons official science long looked askance on Anthropology. Her followers were not regarded as genuine scholars, and, perhaps as a result of this contempt, they were often 'broken men', intellectual outlaws, people of one wild idea. To the scientific mind, anthropologists or ethnologists were a horde who darkly muttered of serpent worship, phallus worship, Arkite doctrines, and the Ten Lost Tribes that kept turning up in the most unexpected places. Anthropologists were said to gloat over dirty rites of dirty savages, and to seek reason where there was none."

(Lang 1901:44)
Cultural survivals are those artifacts which, although found to be irrational and non-functional in one culture, are understood to be comprehensible and functional in another, earlier culture.

In the anthropology of his later career (1889–1910), Lang adopted a theoretical position on cultural transmission closer to Tylor's, which allowed diffusion to a far greater degree than before.
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