Technology-Centred Discourses in European Audiovisual Policy: Will Euro-Techno Out-Fox the US Assembly Line?

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Abstract

This paper outlines the region-building initiatives of European audiovisual policy that are justified by a technology-centred discourse. While highlighting technology as a central and powerful theme in the European policy discourse, this paper begins to challenge the discourse’s depiction of reality. Specifically, the existing audiovisual environment suggests that notwithstanding Europeanization rhetoric in cultural policy decisions, there is a de facto Americanization of audiovisual space. Because of the apparent failure of the European Union to establish a unified competitive market, this paper analyzes the relationship between three variables competing in cultural policymaking. The first section lays out policy discourses characterized by European identity-formation. The second section describes the reality of cultural patterns in the EU that are characterized by diversity and audience fragmentation. The third section explains the reality of audiovisual space that is characterized by American products. A discussion follows of the restrictive effects that such policy discourse has on future policymaking decisions in the EU, bringing to question the success of any new policy orientation that is based around technology in both harmonizing European broadcasting policy and in rivaling its American competitor.

KEYWORDS: European Union, Audiovisual Policy, Technological Determinism, Cultural Industries, International Communications, Regional Integration, Identity Formation
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There are two main and sometimes conflicting initiatives surrounding the European Union’s (EU) audiovisual policy: the intention of forging a common European identity; and the economic priorities of audiovisual industries to be competitive alongside American companies. The conflict between these two principles translates into a paradoxical policy framework where the goal of audiovisual policy in Europe is both the liberalization of products within the EU as well as the protection of European products from the United States. In EU policy discourses, the two policy directions are united and legitimated through a focus on technological developments. This technology-centred rhetoric explains the complex audiovisual policy arrangement in Europe whose results run contrary to both of the above goals. Unable to forge a unified European audiovisual market, the EU’s audiovisual policy cannot overcome the American presence in audiovisual space.

This paper outlines the region-building initiatives of audiovisual policy that are justified by a persuasive technology-centred discourse. While highlighting technology as a central and powerful theme in the European policy discourse that has been presented as the source of profound societal change, this paper begins to challenge the discourse’s depiction of reality. Specifically, the existing audiovisual environment suggests that notwithstanding Europeanization rhetoric in cultural policy decisions, there is a de facto Americanization of audiovisual space. Because of the apparent failure of the EU to establish a unified competitive market, this paper attempts to analyze the relationship between three variables competing in cultural policymaking. The first section lays out policy discourses characterized by European identity-formation. The second section describes the reality of cultural patterns in the EU that are characterized by diversity and audience fragmentation. The third section explains the reality of audiovisual space that is characterized by American products. A discussion follows of the restrictive effects that such policy discourse has on future policymaking decisions in the EU. This calls into question the success of any new policy orientation that is based around technology in both harmonizing European broadcasting policy and in rivaling its American competitor. By foregrounding discourse in European audiovisual policy, this paper aims to evaluate the inaccuracy of technology-centred rhetoric.

Introducing technology-centred discourses

Collective interaction through language constructs human reality. Through rhetorical processes, stories are used to shape the understanding of “immutable truths” (Leonardi & Jackson, 2004:616). N. Fairclough delineates discourse as linking language and society, where language is seen as a form of social practice. In this way, discourse is not only a mode of identity and knowledge formation, but it is also a mode of action. The politics and ideologies framed in stories that privilege certain concep-
tual frameworks over others have the potential, if left uncontested, to institutionalize their principles through action. Because of this, when the goal of certain industries or processes is to control the production of social meaning, leaders or strategists use stories in order to legitimate their decisions, thus easing the transition from one ideological position to another. In the case of scientific practices, stories have the potential to mould what is recognized and understood as fact. Moreover, the changes or reactions that science centred stories produce are often grounded on this undisputed knowledge that is constructed by them.

Technological determinism is a discourse that assumes that technology is an exogenous force that guides social transformation. Mosco (1989:70) describes the discourse as useful because it provides justification for government policies that are sensitive to the perceived or expected effects of the technology. Mirroring Fairclough’s conception of discourse as a social practice that implies action, governmental response to technological developments is restricted to purely reactive measures to the seemingly unfamiliar environment created by the new technologies. In this way, technological change is constructed as an unavoidable force outside of government’s control. Responsibility of the outcome or consequences of policy action is diluted and even avoided in the inevitability of the torrent of scientific advancement. Such technology-centred discourse can also be employed by corporate interests to create an air of inevitability for mergers and market-centred policies. Portraying the effects and intrinsic nature of technology as being progressive, structural and organizational changes are depicted as being indisputable. As a paradigm for understanding recent large-scale technological change, the rise of a global information society has centred technology in policy and industry debates. By addressing the technological discourse around which policy debate is structured, we can better understand the overall direction of cultural policy and begin to discern the cultural, political and economic consequences that follow.

Privileged technological changes in European audiovisual discourse

In the case of the audiovisual industry in Europe and the policy that frames it, the story of technological determinism describes the infrastructure of new communications technologies as having catalytic and irreversible power. New digital technologies that spur additional distribution outlets have virtually eliminated spectrum scarcity in the industry. Since the mid-1980s, broadcast volume and the number of stations available in Western Europe have experienced sharp increases (Galperin, 1999:631). A July 2000 EC press release on European television quotas reported on the number of television channels available in the EU in 1998; there were over 360 television channels apart from local channels. The problem of spectrum scarcity has now been replaced by the problem of content scarcity. Technology on its own has not addressed the insufficiency of content production. Thus, initial production costs remain high compared with the cost for distribution. Because this characteristic of high fixed cost to low variable cost ratio (Hesmondhalgh, 2002:18) favours industries with access to large economies of scale, like the American audiovisual industries, government policy intervention is perceived as necessary to direct production to level the asymmetry that is present between audiovisual industries in different countries.

Audiovisual policy in the European Union is filled with technology-centred rhetoric. Policy discourse in a 1999 EC document indicates that “technology is already bringing about important social [and] cultural changes and will bring about even greater changes in the future […] changes will

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1 Audiovisual industries refers to profit-making institutions involved in the production of television and film products. These products are especially important in any discussion on cultural policymaking in regional trade agreements such as the EU because annexes abound in reference to audiovisual industries, limiting trade liberalization.
likely require the adaptation of [the] regulatory framework [surrounding] this sector” (EC, 1999b:5).

The apparent focus of audiovisual policy discourse on new communication technologies generates what M. Finlay calls a double bind for government action. Focusing on and portraying channel proliferation as an external and inescapable force suggests that it is dangerous not to adopt the new technologies. Specifically in the case of the EU, there is an anxious acknowledgement that the end of spectrum scarcity will make it even more difficult to compete in content with American imports. At the same time, as shown in a 1998 report, the EC insists that “there are tremendous opportunities opening up and Europe must seize them or others will simply do so in [Europe’s] place” (EC 1998b:6). Added to this contradiction that manifests itself in audiovisual policies created by simultaneous discourses of fear and benefits, there exists a manufactured sense of urgency. The EC’s 1997 Green Paper posits that Europe must accept technological changes rapidly to avoid “[its] businesses and citizens [being] left to travel in the slow lane of an information revolution” (EC, 1997:35). The generally held perception of a far-reaching information revolution makes it politically unsustainable for the government to be seen as being unresponsive to technological changes.

The end of spectrum scarcity thus justified the dismantling of state intervention in the broadcasting industries. Reflecting such technology-centred arguments, as of January 1st 1998, all EU member states opened up their telecommunications markets to privatization and free competition. In contrast, before the 1980s, the only two countries open to commercial television were the United Kingdom and Italy (Hoskins et al., 1996:63).

This policy change highlights that discourses centred on technology are more concerned with the mode of distribution rather than the message or content that is conveyed. This diversion from what is in fact important about developments in the audiovisual scene begins to explain the inconsistencies between policy rhetoric and market reality with regards to the forging of a common EU identity.

Policy discourse: Technological Supranationalism, Europeanization and Liberalization

Goodwin and Spittle posit that the debate over the cultural and economic impact of technologies in the European Union is framed around polarized visions of utopia and dystopia. Predictions of increased social cohesion and economic development foster the drive towards Europeanization and facilitate an ideological focus on liberalizing the internal market to take advantage of the constructed benefits of new technologies; concerns about American cultural take-over or imperialism justify protectionist fears. Thus, the discourse on technology in the EU manifests itself in two ways: as a way to promote nationalism at the regional level by strengthening European identity; and as a way to compete against the United States that is presented as a threat to European identity. To tie technological determinism with identity formation, the EU’s policy discourse can be understood as technological supranationalism. Borrowed from D. Young, technological nationalism delineates a policy structure whereby technology is “given the capacity to create a nation by enhancing communication” (Young, 2003:215). As national claims do not necessarily correspond to territorial state boundaries, technologies can also be used in rhetorical processes to facilitate the formation of a supra-national entity or state, in this case, Europe.

The EC, as the EU’s supranational institution mandated with the creation of audiovisual policy, persistently deploys systems of policy for region-building. The 1989 Television Without Frontiers (TWF) initiative first delineated policies regarding the EU’s audiovisual industries in a way that was favourable to regional economic and cultural integration. In their 1984 working Green Paper, the

2 Reference to an extensive “information revolution” is delineated in such works like Goodwin & Spittle (2002), Negroponte (1995) and Loader (1997).
EC stressed that the liberalization of audiovisual services would call attention to a common European heritage. In 1989, the Directive on Broadcasting set out quotas regarding how much the proliferating television channels within Europe could import from non-European countries. Such policy measures began a technologically-centred "social engineering project" with the aim of constructing a "Euro-person" identity, forging European unity and improving market efficiency to rival the American market (Young, 2003:217).

The role of satellite technologies is central to the Europeanization discourse. Article 2 of the 1989 Directive on Broadcasting eliminates individual European governments' sovereignty over their respective national networks in order to facilitate the free movement of broadcasting across national borders through satellite broadcasting (Wheeler, 2004:355). The document's construction around the inevitability of adopting satellite technologies and seizing their effects on distribution and potential for region-wide programming delineates its specific employment of technological determinism. Using this discourse, the TWF initiative commands member states to reserve a majority of their transmission time to European works (Macerola, 2003:48). Although clearly stated, the section that compels members to distribute European works is weakened by a qualifying phrase. Specifically, Article 4 of the Directive on Broadcasting delineates: "Member States shall endure, where practicable [...] that broadcasters reserve for European works a majority proportion of their transmission time" (Galperin, 1999:635). The phrase where practicable renders the policy largely futile. The clause serves to promote the view that the restrictions regarding non-European materials are not judicially enforceable. The contradictory nature of technology-centred discourses is once again apparent, whereby the same rhetoric that justifies European cohesion is used to justify foreign imports. Market forces, consumerism, technology cost factors and even profitability are used to legitimate greater imported content.

While the EU pushes the formation of a European space being protectionist against the United States, its audiovisual policy has facilitated distribution and corporate concentration without necessarily providing Europeans access to a more diverse cultural arena. The 1989 Directive on Broadcasting that increased competition within national markets by breaking up public monopolies fostered the creation of pan-European private media conglomerates (Galperin, 1999:637), two of which are among the largest world-wide. P. M. Leonardi and M. H. Jackson argue that executive discourse surrounding mergers is also technology centred. Such strategic rhetoric can be understood to explain not only the reasons why mergers take place but also why "the change [has] to be this way rather than that" (2004:616). In light of the concern over corporate convergence, we must be careful when accepting policy decisions that are cloaked with national culture rhetoric but that function to protect private, economic-driven interests.

Although the aims of promoting a European identity and fending off its American counterpart translate into policy ideologies that seem contradictory, the opposition is reconciled by a call to action, presenting a case for changes in regulation. In both cases, liberalizing policies are the perceived remedies. However, the same strategy of liberalizing trade on a global scale has made Americanization a threat and rendered Europeanization an elusive target. In this way, there is a gap between the way in which political actors describe technological changes as fostering a European identity and the reality of the situation. As is shown in the following sections, the cultural distances in the EU highlight audience fragmentation. Furthermore, the open international audiovisual space favours American products. Comparing policy rhetoric with this reality of the European audiovisual scene brings into question the effectiveness and legitimacy of technology-centred discourses.

**The reality: Cultural distances**

Technological determinism informs the reasoning that satellite television creates transnational cultures such as a European culture. However, it cannot be taken for granted that economic global-
ization and technological advances spill over to the cultural realm to imply homogeneity in cultural consumption patterns. A free flow of cultural products within Europe does not necessarily forge a common European identity. The extent of cultural distances in the EU suggests that a less technology-deterministic and economy-focused outlook on broadcasting policy would dissociate cultural from economic-political integration. Noting the cultural fragmentation that exists within Europe, the price that the EU has had to pay for its technological nationalist and deterministic discourse has been the suppression of the cultural identities of different communities in its audiovisual policy.

The cultural diversity in the EU is reflected in social indicators such as ethnicity, language, and religious groups both across the continent between member countries and within individual territorial spaces. As a case in point, Malhotra et al. cite Luxembourg that has less than 400,000 inhabitants and is made up of five ethnic groups (Malhotra, 1998:486). The diversity in languages within the EU is significant in determining consumption patterns. Galperin (1999:667) reports that in 1991, there were more than 13 national or regional broadcast languages in the EU. With the exception of some productions in the English language, most European cultural products do not travel outside their language area. Because of the isolated nature of most languages, major European producers have strategies largely concerned with strengthening their positions within individual national markets.

Cultural fragmentation translates into fragmentation within national markets. Applied in the European audiovisual audience scene, preferences in both content and style are very differentiated. For example, sports and variety shows are preferred in Italy; films are preferred in France; dramas are preferred in the United Kingdom (Galperin, 1999:667). Because of cultural and consumption differences, European productions tend to be so nationally specific that they offer limited scope for audiences elsewhere. The result of these language-specific and nationally-focused strategies is a “collection of distinct domestic markets” (Silj, 2002:37) lacking popular interest in products of other European countries. In 1997, the EC estimated that 80 percent of the films produced in the EU never leave their country of origin. Therefore, there is no sizable European market. Reflecting the absence of a unified audiovisual space, the share of European film market ranges from 22 percent in Spain and France to a mere 3 percent in the United Kingdom (EC, 1997a).

The reality: Consumption patterns in the European audiovisual scene

In terms of volume, a single European market is almost as large as the American one. In 2004, the average German adult watched 230 minutes of television daily; the average adult in the United Kingdom watched 172 minutes; as a comparison, the average adult in the United States, traditionally regarded as having inflated mass-culture consumption patterns, consumed 258 minutes of television time (Reding, 2004). However, as shown above, there is no unified European market. The impact of Europeanization is further dimmed in comparison to the amount of capital that is spent by European countries on American programs. Between 1988 and 1995, Table 1 shows that the European trade deficit with the United States in audiovisual industries grew exponentially.

### Table 1
EU Trade in Audiovisual Industries with the United States
(U.S. Dollars, Millions)

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1995
As Table 1 indicates, net imports in EU audiovisual trade with the United States grew from 1,978 million dollars to 6,263 million dollars, or over 300 percent, in just seven years.

The EU is concerned about the relative weakness of European audio-visual industries in the globalized international market. This fear is due to the high fixed cost to low variable cost ratio in cultural industries that allows the United States to pursue greater economies of scale because of its large domestic market. In fact, audiovisual policy has been defined in opposition to a culturally invasive American counterpart, and the threat of Americanization has contributed to and legitimated the technological supranationalistic discourse. However, the limited supply of European content in relation to the infrastructure’s demand increases the incentives to buy inexpensive and mass appeal entertainment material from American companies. Consequently, American films and television programs consistently make up over 80 percent of the European cultural market (Galperin, 1999:665).

As is shown in Table 1, in 1992, the EU states’ expenditure of $5 billion on US audiovisual products is magnified when compared with the $300 million that was spent on European products by the United States. The commonality in the European audiovisual space is in effect the distribution of American cultural products.

The asymmetry present in United States-European Union audiovisual trade can also be explained by noting that the cultural products that most easily traverse the large and multicultural U.S. domestic market can also easily traverse the multicultural European continent and be unaffected by any European national boundary. Given Europe’s historical legacy of conflicting nationalisms, Europeans would rather consume American products than products of respective rival nations. This argument has been especially highlighted in France, where the issue has been applied to the clash between French and Anglo-Saxons (Schlesinger, 2001:106). Thus, an American audiovisual success is likely to be an international audiovisual success. The above scene depicts an environment that runs contrary to the EU’s stated goal of Europeanization in cultural policymaking. As the policy’s effectiveness comes into question, so does the success of the discourse that legitimates an unsuccessful policy.

Consequences to the future of audiovisual policymaking

In terms of recent and future technological developments, the focus on digital technologies in communications policy and industry discourses has facilitated the emergence of interactive television in Europe. An “apparently inevitable technological logic that all communications [are] integrated on the same networks” has been delineated whereby various information services, including interactive technologies like video delivery are included in the network (qtd. in Kim, 2001:76). Because of the business potential for added services, telecommunications firms try to expand their market share and open new profit streams. To expedite the process of change, the firms present the medium as distinct and irreversible in its technological advances. Indeed, this is another facet of technological determinism that outlines a process whereby technology develops on a progressive course. Thus, the interests of supranational policy-drivers lie in further liberalizing audiovisual industries. They work...
with corporate interests to obscure their agency through technology-centred rhetoric and structure the audiovisual market around further technological convergence.

The EU is responding to the interactive-technology rhetoric of European communications companies by dealing with the topic of how the EU should regulate the emerging modes of delivery for audio-visual content. Viviane Reding, a member of the commission responsible for Information Society and Media, notes that there appears to be consensus among policymakers that the present regulatory framework needs to “evolve to respond to the massive changes that have taken place in terms of technological and market developments.” A 2002 report prepared on behalf of the European Commission Directorate–General for Education and Culture highlights the changes in technology and predicts how this will translate to the European audiovisual environment until the year 2010.

Although the quantity of variables examined may have increased, policy initiatives are still formulated around technological change. Thus, in 1999, the Commission set out its priorities for the next five years “in the light of technological developments” (EC, 199b). Specifically, the outlook for audio-visual industry development until 2010 in the EU is centred around two scenarios. The report explains an interactivity scenario based on the development of new interactive systems. The personalisation scenario is premised on the development of a modified, more personalised offering of audio-visual services that are already available. The interactivity model assumes that the TV screen and other emerging devices will be developed in a way that consumers will use them pro-actively. These new uses are expected to divide the time spent using the television over the different interactive services and traditional TV viewing. The personalization model assumes the ability to release content on demand that enables the user to create his/her own specific TV channel arrangement completely independent from any preconceived channel layout. Policymakers expect that consumers will shift their viewing time from free commercial broadcasters where content is predetermined to personalised channels (EC, 2002). In setting out its guidelines for audio-visual policy to deal with these changes, the Commission concluded that “self-regulatory mechanisms may well play a bigger role in achieving public interest objectives” (Reding, 2004). Added to this focus on the individual, policymakers continue to argue that Europeans will choose content that best reflects uniquely European values. In this way, if European companies and policies focus on new interactive technologies that facilitate personalization, the European audiovisual environment can develop into a power-bloc to rival its American counterpart.

New policy initiatives that still cling to Europeanization as their driving force run the risk of treating interactive technologies as completely novel developments. The technology-centred policy narrative is extremely problematic because it foresees cultural consumption tendencies to be tied to and shaped by technological change and thus legitimates further liberalizing audiovisual industries. Although audience fragmentation and cultural distances are exemplified in the EU, the demand for audiovisual products that have mass appeal and that are inexpensive is still high. In fact, the 2002 EC Report also highlights that the European consumer’s behaviour has not yet changed (EC, 2002). The overall viewing time has only marginally increased, and consumers still tend to watch the same channels. The four largest channels in each country still capture more than 70% of audiences. Thus, industry development of the kind that the United States employs as to maximize its distribution capabilities and audience reach will thus remain an advantage. So long as the consumer demand is present for mass-appeal broadcasting, channels will have to carry this type of content due to audience requirements for economic sustainability. If 80% of broadcasting content in Europe remains American, personalization attempts will still be predominantly arranged around imports from the United States and thus will not further the European agenda. Therefore, continued liberalization and new policy initiatives focused around interactive technologies will not contribute to the stated goal of Eu-
Concluding remarks

The disproportionate expansion of the means of distribution for audiovisual services resulted in an exponential rise in the number of television hours to be filled. This development was perceived by the EC as legitimating its role of facilitating the unification of the fragmented national European industries. The examination of the interaction between economic and social goals and cultural realities suggests that cultural policymaking in the EU has been largely shaped as a response to current and anticipated technological and industry changes. In other words, the EU’s audiovisual policy has failed to forge a unified European market that can compete with the United States in large part because it has focused on expanded spectrum capacity to legitimate Europeanization and ignored the reality of its cultural diversity and the reality of its content-generation challenges. Perceived spectrum scarcity has created a double bind, whereby digital technologies are interpreted as necessitating their full adoption. With this deterministic perception, government policy responses have been reactive, and audiovisual policies have been framed around technological developments. The recent focus on interactive technologies is just as binding.

In order to get out of such contradictions and failures, policy discourse must move beyond these dichotomies. Finlay (1987:67-8) suggests that instead of adopting all or none of the technologies, it is possible to adopt some but reject others, justifying choices with social or cultural goals in mind. Providing incentives for technologies that foster the reduction of entry-level capital needed for content creation would further the European agenda by facilitating the generation of European content. By restricting the number of distribution licenses that are granted and thus, limiting the amount of hours that must be filled with content, production of European content would be given time to reach more acceptable goals in terms of viewing hours.
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